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Researchers have long been interested in the relation between emotion understanding and theory of mind.
This study investigates a cue to mental states that has rarely been investigated: the dynamics of valenced
emotional expressions. When the valence of a character’s facial expression was stable between an expected
and observed outcome, children (N = 122; M = 5.0 years) recovered the character’s desires but did not consis-
tently recover her beliefs. When the valence changed, older but not younger children recovered both the char-
acters’ beliefs and desires. In contrast, adults jointly recovered agents’ beliefs and desires in all conditions.
These results suggest that the ability to infer mental states from the dynamics of emotional expressions devel-
ops gradually through early and middle childhood.
Researchers have long noted correlations between
the development of children’s belief–desire psychol-
ogy and their understanding of emotions (e.g.,
Bartsch & Estes, 1996; De Rosnay, Fink, Begeer,
Slaughter, & Peterson, 2014; Harwood & Farrar,
2006; Hughes & Dunn, 1998; LaBounty, Wellman,
Olson, Lagattuta, & Liu, 2008; Wellman, 2014;
Widen, 2013; Widen & Russell, 2008), and proposed
that children construct an intuitive theory of mind
in which beliefs, desires, and emotions are causally
linked (e.g., Harris, Johnson, Hutton, Andrews, &
Cooke, 1989; Thompson & Lagattuta, 2006; Lagat-
tuta, Wellman, & Flavell, 1997; Lagattuta & Well-
man, 2001; see Harris, 2008 and Wellman, 2014 for
discussion and review). Here we ask to what extent
this intuitive theory allows children to recover
others’ beliefs and desires from their emotional
reactions to events.
Given the extensive history of work on theory of
mind and emotion, some justiﬁcation is required for
posing this as an unanswered question. Note, how-
ever, that much of this research has looked at chil-
dren’s ability to use knowledge of others’ beliefs and
desires to predict their emotions. Here we are inter-
ested in the inverse problem: children’s ability to use
emotional expressions to recover other mental states.
To follow, we brieﬂy summarize past research and
then ask whether children can use someone’s emo-
tional reactions to anticipating and observing an out-
come to jointly infer her beliefs and desires.
Human beings are sensitive to others’ emotional
expressions from birth (Field, Woodson, Greenberg,
& Cohen, 1982). Infants show different patterns of
behavior in response to happy, fearful, sad, and
angry faces and voices (Field et al., 1982; Haviland
& Lelwica, 1987; Montague & Walker-Andrews,
2001); represent emotions cross-modally (Walker-
Andrews, 1997); and discriminate expressions even
within valence (e.g., matching happy faces to happy
voices and interested faces to interested voices;
Soken & Pick, 1999; see also Flom & Bahrick, 2007;
Haviland & Lelwica, 1987; Hoehl & Striano, 2008;
Soderstrom, Reimchen, Sauter, & Morgan, 2017).
Older infants check their parents’ faces given
ambiguous stimuli and approach or retreat depend-
ing on the valence of the parents’ facial expression
(e.g., Hornik & Gunnar, 1988; Moses, Baldwin,
Rosicky, & Tidball, 2001; Mumme & Fernald, 2003;
Sorce, Emde, Campos, & Klinnert, 1985; Walden &
Ogan, 1988).
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Infants might respond differentially to emotional
expressions without understanding emotions per se;
however, recent research suggests that even infants
relate emotional expressions to goal-directed
actions. As early as 8 months, infants expect agents
to express positive rather than negative emotions
when they achieve their goals (Skerry & Spelke,
2014). By age 2, children explicitly predict that an
agent will be happy if her desires are fulﬁlled and
sad if they are thwarted (e.g., Wellman & Woolley,
1990; Yuill, 1984). In 2-year-olds, these emotion con-
cepts may be relatively undifferentiated, distin-
guishing primarily between positive and negative
valences (see, e.g., Widen & Russell, 2008, 2010);
nonetheless, children appropriately map goal fulﬁll-
ment onto positive emotions and goal failure to
negative ones.
More mixed ﬁndings have been obtained for
belief inferences. As young as 3, children seem to
experience suspenseful emotions in response to
false belief scenarios; they are more likely to furrow
their brow and bite their lips when they see that
someone is about to act consistent with a false (vs.
true) belief (Moll, Kane, & McGowan, 2016).
Between 4 and 6, children become increasingly
likely to predict that someone else will feel sur-
prised if her beliefs are violated and feel happy if
she falsely believes that an action will fulﬁll her
desires (Hadwin & Perner, 1991; Harris et al., 1989;
Wellman & Banerjee, 1991). However, considerable
research suggests that children’s ability to attribute
the emotional reactions generated by true and false
beliefs lags behind their ability to explicitly repre-
sent the beliefs themselves (e.g., De Rosnay, Pons,
Harris, & Morrell, 2004; Hadwin & Perner, 1991;
Harris et al., 1989; Pons, Harris, & De Rosnay,
2004; Ruffman & Keenan, 1996; Wellman & Bartsch,
1988). Thus, 4- and 5-year-olds may know that Red
Riding Hood falsely believes her grandmother is in
bed and nonetheless conclude that Red Riding
Hood is frightened (Bradmetz & Schneider, 1999).
Fewer studies have looked at children’s ability to
reason backward from emotional reactions to desires
and beliefs, and again the strongest evidence is for
inferences about desires. By 18 months, infants can
use an agent’s verbal cues (“Yummy!” vs. “Yucky!”)
together with her emotional expressions to decide if
she wants a food different from what the child her-
self wants (e.g., broccoli rather than goldﬁsh crack-
ers; Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997). Similarly, 2- and 3-
year-olds can use someone’s emotional reaction to
infer whether she is looking at desirable crackers or
undesirable broccoli (Wellman, Phillips, & Rodri-
guez, 2000). By preschool, children map happy and
sad emotional reactions onto familiar desirable or
undesirable events (e.g., getting a puppy or dropping
an ice cream cone; Denham, Zoller, & Couchoud,
1994; Fabes, Eisenberg, McCormick, & Wilson, 1988;
Gnepp, McKee, & Domanic, 1987; Harris, Olthof,
Terwogt, & Hardman, 1987; Widen & Russell, 2010).
However, children younger than 6 rarely refer to
agents’ beliefs in explaining others’ emotional reac-
tions (Rieffe, Terwogt, & Cowan, 2005). One excep-
tion is that 4-year-olds mention beliefs in explaining
fearful reactions (e.g., saying “she thought it was a
ghost” if a character is scared at hearing a noise)
and atypical ones (saying “she thought it would be
something else” if a character is sad upon opening
a present; Rieffe et al., 2005). Four-year-olds also
spontaneously refer to beliefs in explaining surprise
or curiosity and do so more often given these “epis-
temic” emotions than happy or sad ones (Wellman
& Banerjee, 1991).
As noted earlier, however, by preschool, children
have learned scripts relating familiar events and
emotions (e.g., Fabes et al., 1988; Gnepp et al., 1987;
Harris et al., 1987; Widen & Russell, 2010). Children
might link fear and ghosts or a disappointing gift
with sadness (Rieffe et al., 2005) without necessarily
reasoning about the relation between emotions and
beliefs more broadly. Similarly, children might
guess that an agent did not know about or expect
unusual or mysterious events (“she didn’t think
there would be a giraffe”; “she didn’t know what
was in the box”; Wellman & Banerjee, 1991),
because the events are atypical or mysterious rather
than because they reason about the beliefs underly-
ing emotional reactions generally.
Perhaps the strongest support for the idea that
children infer the thoughts underlying emotional
responses comes from work showing that children
invoke others’ thoughts about the past to explain
their emotions in the present (e.g., Harris, Guz, Lip-
ian, & Man-Shu, 1985; Lagattuta et al., 1997; Lagat-
tuta & Wellman, 2001; Taylor & Harris, 1983).
Four-year-olds recognize that people respond more
intensely to recent events than past events; by 6,
children recognize that people’s responses to events
depend on whether they remember them and that
people are happier remembering positive experi-
ences and forgetting negative ones (e.g., Harris
et al., 1985; Taylor & Harris, 1983). Children also
understand that individuals’ particular histories can
lead to idiosyncratic emotional responses. If a girl’s
doll is broken by a clown, children predict that she
will be sad on seeing another clown and explain
her sadness by saying she is thinking about her doll
(Lagattuta & Wellman, 2001; Lagattuta et al., 1997).
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Findings like these suggest that children under-
stand that thoughts affect feelings. However, they
do not address the question of whether children
can use someone’s emotional reactions to recover
the content of her otherwise unknown thoughts.
Theory of mind is a hard inference problem because
it often involves situations where the only informa-
tion available is that which can be gleaned from the
environment and observed behavior. In these cases,
an observer has no more access to others’ past his-
tory of emotional experiences than she does to their
beliefs and desires. However, it is precisely in such
contexts that others’ emotional reactions might be
an especially valuable cue to their mental states.
Collectively, these ﬁndings leave open the ques-
tion of the degree to which children can use their
understanding of emotions to gain insight into
others’ minds. It may be difﬁcult or impossible (in
the absence of extensive prior knowledge) to recover
the representations driving the changes in emotional
expressions when these changes are unrelated to
external, observable events (e.g., as when someone
looks happy at one moment and sad the next simply
because they ﬁrst think about a joyous event and
then an unhappy one). However, it may be possible
to recover others’ mental states when these changes
are probabilistically associated with external events.
Here we focus on agent’s emotional expressions in
response to testimony about, and observation of, an
event. When an agent’s mental states are otherwise
underdetermined by her actions and the context,
can children compare her emotional reactions to an
expected and observed outcome to jointly recover
her desires and beliefs?
Previous work on inferring beliefs from emotions
has found both successes and failures between ages
4 and 6 (e.g., Hadwin & Perner, 1991; Harris et al.,
1989; Rieffe et al., 2005; Wellman & Banerjee, 1991),
thus we focus our investigation on the same age
range. In contrast to most previous work, we focus
(a) speciﬁcally on “backwards inferences,” from
emotional reactions to beliefs and desires; (b) on
children’s ability to recover both beliefs and desires
simultaneously; (c) on inferences about ordinary
(rather than unusual, surprising) events; and (d) on
a cue to agents’ mental states that has rarely been
investigated: the dynamics of valenced facial
expressions. We predict that children may be able
to use an agent’s emotional reactions to anticipated
and observed outcomes to recover both her beliefs
and desires. Speciﬁcally, given the emotional reac-
tion to the observed outcome, children may be able
to infer the agent’s desires; given the presence or
absence of a change in valence between anticipated
and observed outcomes, children may be able to
infer the content of the agent’s initial beliefs.
Finally, because the question of interest here is
whether children can infer mental states from the
dynamics of emotional reactions to expected and
observed outcomes, we will elide a question that has
been the focus of many previous investigations: How
can children draw inferences from emotional reac-
tions to the emotions themselves? (e.g., Ekman &
Oster, 1979; Gross & Ballif, 1991; Izard, 1994; Widen
& Russell, 2008, 2010). We take as a premise that,
within a well-speciﬁed context and shared cultural
knowledge, 4- and 5-year-olds can use prototypical
happy and sad facial expressions to infer happiness
and sadness (see, e.g., Widen, 2013). Our question is
whether children can use information in others’ emo-
tional responses to anticipated and observed out-
comes to jointly infer their beliefs and desires.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants
Thirty-two children (M = 5.0 years, range: 4.1–
5.9; 50% girls) were recruited from an urban chil-
dren’s museum between April and July 2014.
Although most of the children were White and
middle class, a range of ethnicities and socioeco-
nomic backgrounds reﬂecting the diversity of the
local population (47% European American, 24%
African American, 9% Asian, 17% Latino, 4% two
or more races) and the museum population (29% of
museum attendees receive free or discounted
admission) were represented throughout.
To follow and throughout, we treat age as a con-
tinuous variable and then perform post hoc analy-
ses in age bins (4-year-olds and 5-year-olds) in
order to enable comparison with the previous litera-
ture on theory of mind, which has largely treated
age groups categorically (see Wellman, 2014 for
review). To ensure a balanced distribution across
ages, children were recruited in age bins consisting
of 16 four-year-olds (M = 4.4 years, range: 4.1–4.8;
56% girls) and 16 ﬁve-year-olds (M = 5.5 years,
range: 5.0–5.9; 44% girls).
Materials
Each child saw four illustrated stories (see Fig-
ure 1), two presenting valence stable conditions
(happy–happy and sad–sad) and two presenting va-
lence change conditions (happy–sad and sad–happy).
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Because we used canonical happy and sad faces,
and research suggests that by age 4, children can
interpret these as such (see Widen, 2013 for review),
expressions coded by the Facial Action Coding Sys-
tem (Ekman & Friesen, 1976) were not critical here;
the facial expressions used here were from istock
photos (http://www.istockphoto.com/). The map-
ping between stories and conditions, the order of
conditions, and the expected–actual contents of the
containers were counterbalanced across partici-
pants, resulting in a total of 16 storybooks. A differ-
ent agent and a different bunny (indicated by its
color) were used in each story.
Procedure
Children were tested individually; all sessions
were videotaped. Children were asked check
questions to encourage them to follow along. Incor-
rect responses were corrected throughout. (Collaps-
ing data from all three experiments in the study,
children’s accuracies on the six check questions
were .74, .73, .80, .99, .99, and 1.00, respectively.
Incorrect responses consisted primarily of guessing:
e.g., when asked “Do we know what is in the con-
tainer?” or “Do we know what Sally wants to
eat?,” children who answered incorrectly would say
“an apple” or “a banana” rather than say “no.” No
children were excluded on the bases of incorrect
responses; however, none of the results change if
only children who answered all six check questions
correctly are included.)
Each story was read consecutively, as follows
(using the apple–banana story as an example). The
experimenter placed Picture 1 on the table and said,
“This is a container. Sometimes there is an apple
Figure 1. Examples of picture stimuli used in the happy–happy, sad–sad, sad–happy, and happy–sad conditions, respectively. The
mapping between stories and conditions, the order of conditions, and the expected–actual contents of the containers were counterbal-
anced across participants. See text for details.
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inside and sometimes there is a banana. But before
we open it, we don’t know what’s inside.” She
introduced Picture 2 and said, “This is Sally. She
wants something to eat. She might want an apple,
or she might want a banana; but she hasn’t told
us.” Children were asked (Check Questions 1 and
2): “Do we know what’s in the container?” and
“Do we know what Sally wants to eat?” The exper-
imenter introduced Picture 3 and said, “This is the
pink bunny. The bunny wants to help. So the
bunny says: ‘Hi, Sally! Let me tell you what’s in
the container!’ But, the bunny could be right or
wrong.” Children were asked (Check Question 3):
“Is the bunny always right?” The experimenter
introduced Picture 4, with the facial expression
appropriate to the condition and said, “The bunny
tells Sally what he thinks is in the container. But he
doesn’t tell us. It’s a secret. After hearing the bun-
ny’s secret, Sally’s response is this . . .” Children
were asked (Check Question 4): “Is she happy or
sad?” The experimenter introduced Picture 5 and
said, “Then the bunny opens the container and
takes out what’s inside.” Children were asked
(Check Question 5): “What’s inside?” Pointing to
Picture 5, the experimenter said, “After seeing
what’s actually in the container, Sally’s response is
this . . .” Children were asked (Check Question 6):
“Is she happy or sad?”
Finally, children were asked two test questions, in
ﬁxed order. The experimenter pointed to Picture 5
and asked (desire question): “Based on this response,
what did Sally want to eat today, an apple or a
banana?” Then, she pointed to Picture 4 and asked
(belief question): “Before the container was opened,
but after hearing the bunny’s secret, what did Sally
think was inside: an apple or a banana?”
Coding
The ﬁrst author (YW) coded all the responses to
the two test questions ofﬂine from videotape.
Seventy-ﬁve percent of these responses were
recoded by an independent coder blind to hypothe-
ses and conditions; there was 100% agreement on
children’s responses. Children’s responses to the
desire question were coded as “actual content” if
they chose the content in the container and “alter-
native” if they chose the other food. Children’s
responses to the belief question were coded as “true
belief” if they chose the content in the container
and “false belief” if they chose the other food. Two
of 256 responses could not be classiﬁed (i.e., “both”
and “she did not know”); these were coded as
missing values. (Categorizing these as wrong
responses instead of missing values does not
change the results here, or in the following experi-
ments.)
Results and Discussion
As discussed (see Participants), we ﬁrst analyze
the effect of age as a continuous variable and fol-
low-up with post hoc analyses by age group to
enable comparison with the previous literature.
Generalized estimating equations were used for all
analyses except as indicated. Generalized estimating
equations are comparable to repeated measures
analysis of variance (ANOVA), but unlike repeated
measures ANOVA, they are appropriate for cate-
gorical outcomes (as in the forced choice binary
responses here) and robust to missing cells (see
Coding). See Figure 2 for results.
Desires
There was a main effect of age, b = 3.07,
SE = 1.07; v2(1, N = 128) = 8.20, p = .004, and of
the valence of the second facial expression,
b = 33.49, SE = 4.88; v2(1, N = 128) = 12,913.87,
p < .001, on children’s responses; the interaction
was also signiﬁcant, b = 3.07, SE = 1.09; v2(1,
N = 128) = 7.92, p = .005. Five-year-olds performed
at ceiling; all children inferred that the agent
wanted the food in the container when the ﬁnal
expression was happy (happy–happy, sad–happy)
and the alternative when the expression was nega-
tive (sad–sad, happy–sad). Four-year-olds per-
formed at ceiling when the expression was positive
but had slightly more difﬁculty when the expres-
sion was negative (sad–sad: 12/16, p = .077, 95% CI
[0.48, 0.93]; happy–sad: 13/16, p = .021, 95% CI
[0.54, 0.96]; comparisons to chance by binomial test
throughout).
Beliefs
There was no main effect of age, b = 0.60,
SE = 0.42; v2(1, N = 126) = 1.09, p = .297, but there
was a main effect of the presence or absence of a
valence change, b = 9.67, SE = 3.62; v2(1, N =
126) = 11.13, p < .001, and an interaction, b = 2.24,
SE = 0.76; v2(1, N = 126) = 8.82, p = .003.
For 5-year-olds, the presence or absence of a
valence change affected their responses, b = 2.84,
SE = 0.67; v2(1, N = 63) = 18.20, p < .001. Five-year-
olds inferred false beliefs in the valence change con-
ditions (sad–happy: 15/16, p < .001, 95% CI [0.70,
1.00]; happy–sad: 13/16, p = .021, 95% CI [0.54,
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0.96]), but did not infer true beliefs in the valence
stable conditions (happy–happy: 11/15, p = .119,
95% CI [0.45, 0.92]; sad–sad: 11/16, p = .210, 95%
CI [0.41, 0.89]).
By contrast, 4-year-olds had difﬁculty recovering
the agent’s beliefs in both conditions. The effect of
the presence or absence of a valence change was
not signiﬁcant, b = 0.06, SE = 0.51; v2(1, N =
63) = 0.01, p = .910. Children performed at chance
in all conditions (valence change, false belief
responses: sad–happy: 8/16, p = 1.000, 95% CI
[0.25, 0.75]; happy–sad: 10/16, p = .455, 95% CI
[0.35, 0.85]; valence stable, true belief responses:
happy–happy: 8/15, p = 1.000, 95% CI [0.27, 0.79];
sad–sad: 6/16, p = .454, 95% CI [0.15, 0.65]).
Experiment 2: Replication
Given concern about the reproducibility of scien-
tiﬁc results (Open Science Collaboration, 2015),
we conducted a preregistered replication (Open
Science Framework: https://osf.io/e36vm/?view_only=
643ddd21a06a49ca987105b1069b487a). The preregis-
tered analyses were the generalized estimated
equations by age group, predicting that the pres-
ence or absence of a valence change would affect
belief inferences in 5- but not 4-year-olds (https://
osf.io/kx97a/?view_only=5590ef3ed01548b4b963ba
83667fdd63). We also tested adults to clarify children’s
responses to the valence stable conditions.
Method
Participants
Thirty-two children (M = 4.9 years, range: 4.0–
5.9; 41% girls) were recruited from the museum
between August and September 2015. To ensure a
balanced distribution across ages, children were
recruited in age bins consisting of 16 four-year-olds
(M = 4.4 years, range: 4.0–4.9; 31% girls) and 16
Figure 2. Five- and 4-year-olds’ inferences about desires and beliefs in Experiments 1–3. *p < .05. +p < .10.
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ﬁve-year-olds (M = 5.4 years, range: 5.0–5.9; 50%
girls).
Sixty-ﬁve adults were recruited on Amazon
Mechanical Turk. Participation was restricted to
individuals with IP addresses from the United
States and with HIT approval rate of 95% or
higher. Because Amazon Mechanical Turk workers
are paid by the task, there is an incentive to rush
through tasks. To ensure that online participants
were attentive, check questions for the adults
were used as exclusion criteria. Four partici-
pants were excluded for answering one or more
check questions incorrectly (see Materials and
Procedure).
Materials and Procedure
The materials and procedure for the children
were identical to the initial experiment. Adults were
tested online using the same materials except that
all materials were written and only three of the
check questions were asked: “Is the bunny always
right?,” “Is Sally happy or sad?” when Sally
responded to the bunny’s secret, and “Is Sally
happy or sad?” when Sally responded to the actual
contents in the container.
Coding
Coding was identical to the initial experiment.
Seventy-ﬁve percent of responses were recoded by
an independent coder blind to hypotheses and con-
ditions; there was 99% agreement on children’s
responses. Four of 256 responses could not be clas-
siﬁed (e.g., “lollipop and cake” and “I don’t
know”); as in Experiment 1, these responses were
coded as missing values.
Results and Discussion
Desires
For children, there was a main effect of age,
b = 2.16, SE = 0.70; v2(1, N = 128) = 9.70, p = .002,
and the valence of the ﬁnal expression, b = 36.85,
SE = 3.28; v2(1, N = 128) = 19,652.07, p < .001; the
interaction was also signiﬁcant, b = 2.16, SE = 0.72;
v2(1, N = 128) = 8.93, p = .003. Five-year-olds per-
formed near ceiling (happy–happy: 16/16, p < .001,
95% CI [0.97, 1.00]; sad–happy: 16/16, p < .001,
95% CI [0.97, 1.00]; sad–sad: 15/16, p < .001, 95%
CI [0.70, 1.00]; happy–sad: 15/16, p < .001, 95% CI
[0.70, 1.00]). Four-year-olds performed at ceiling
when the ﬁnal expression was positive but again
had more difﬁculty when the expression was nega-
tive (happy–happy: 16/16, p < .001, 95% CI [0.97,
1.00]; sad–happy: 16/16, p < .001, 95% CI [0.97,
1.00]; sad–sad: 10/16, p = .455, 95% CI [0.35, 0.85];
happy–sad: 11/16, p = .210, 95% CI [0.41, 0.89]).
Beliefs
There was a main effect of the presence or
absence of a valence change, b = 1.81, SE = 3.22;
v2(1, N = 124) = 8.95, p < .003. Neither the main
effect of age, b = 0.26, SE = 0.42; v2(1, N = 124)
= 0.01, p = .941, nor an interaction between age and
a valence change, b = 0.60, SE = 0.66; v2(1,
N = 124) = 0.84, p = .360) was signiﬁcant.
Again, 5-year-olds’ inferences were affected by
the presence or absence of a valence change,
b = 1.29, SE = 0.55; v2(1, N = 63) = 5.63, p = .018.
In the valence change conditions, children tended
to infer false beliefs (sad–happy: 12/16, p = .077,
95% CI [0.48, 0.93]; happy–sad: 12/16, p = .077,
95% CI [0.48, 0.93]); children did not infer true
beliefs in the valence stable conditions (happy–
happy: 9/16, p = .804, 95% CI [0.30, 0.80]; sad–sad:
8/15, p = 1.000, 95% CI [0.27, 0.79]).
Also as predicted, the effect of valence change
was not signiﬁcant in 4-year-olds, although there
was a trend on replication, b = 1.00, SE = 0.53;
v2(1, N = 61) = 3.53, p = .060. Four-year-olds did
not perform above chance in any condition
(sad–happy: 10/16, p = .455, 95% CI [0.35, 0.85];
happy–sad: 11/16, p = .210, 95% CI [0.41, 0.89];
happy–happy: 9/14, p = .424, [0.35, 0.87]; sad–sad:
8/15, p = 1.000, 95% CI [0.27, 0.79]; see Figure 2).
Aggregating the data from the initial experiment
and replication suggests that children’s chance per-
formance on the belief inferences is unlikely to be
due to the experiments being underpowered: Over-
all, there was a main effect of the presence or
absence of a valence change in 5-year-olds,
b = 1.99, SE = 0.41; v2(1, N = 126) = 23.2, p < .001,
but not in 4-year-olds, b = 0.51, SE = .36; v2(1,
N = 124) = 1.98, p = .160. Five-year-olds in the
valence change conditions inferred false beliefs
(sad–happy: 27/32, p < .001, 95% CI [0.67, 0.95];
happy–sad: 25/32, p = .002, 95% CI [0.60, 0.91]),
but chose at chance in the valence stable conditions
(happy–happy: 20/31, p = .150, 95% CI [0.45, 0.81];
sad–sad: 19/31, p = .281, 95% CI [0.42, 0.78]);
4-year-olds chose at chance in all conditions
(sad–happy: 18/32, p = .600, 95% CI [0.38, 0.74];
happy–sad: 21/32, p = .110, 95% CI [0.47, 0.81];
happy–happy: 17/29, p = .458, 95% CI [0.39, 0.77];
sad–sad: 14/31, p = .720, 95% CI [0.27, 0.64]).
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Aggregating the data also allows us to see whether
4-year-olds’ failures to infer false beliefs in the
valence change conditions might be due to
task switching demands. However, those
4-year-olds who saw a valence change story on the
ﬁrst trial were no more likely to succeed on the ﬁrst
trial than overall (10/17, p = .629, 95% CI [0.33,
0.82]).
For comparison, adults recovered agents’ desires
near ceiling (happy–happy: 61/61, p < .001, 95% CI
[0.94, 1.00]; sad–happy: 60/61, p < .001, 95% CI
[0.91, 1.00]; sad–sad: 61/61, p < .001, 95% CI [0.94,
1.00]; happy–sad: 61/61, p < .001, 95% CI [0.94,
1.00]). Comparing the adults with the 5-year-olds,
there was no main effect of age, b = 1.52, SE = 0.39;
v2(1, N = 370) = 2.9, p = .090, but there was a main
effect of the presence or absence of a valence
change, b = 2.73, SE = 1.51; v2(1, N = 370) = 133.5,
p < .001, and an interaction, b = 2.36, SE = 0.59;
v2(1, N = 370) = 15.8, p < .001. Post hoc analyses
found that the presence or absence of a valence
change affected adults’ belief inferences, b = 4.36,
SE = .43; v2(1, N = 244) = 105.00, p < .001. In the
valence change conditions, adults and 5-year-olds
both inferred false beliefs—111/122 adults versus
52/64 ﬁve-year-olds; v2(1, N = 186) = 2.83, p = .093,
95% CI [0.02, 0.22], two-sample test for equality
of proportions with continuity correction; adults,
sad–happy: 59/61, p < .001, 95% CI [0.89, 1.00];
happy–sad: 52/61, p < .001, 95% CI [0.74, 0.93].
However, unlike children, adults inferred true
beliefs in the valence stable conditions—108/122
adults versus 39/62 ﬁve-year-olds; v2(1,
N = 184) = 15.20, p < .001, 95% CI [0.11, 0.40];
adults, happy–happy: 60/61, p < .001, 95% CI [0.91,
1.00]; sad–sad: 48/61, p < .001, 95% CI [0.66, 0.88].
Experiment 3
There are two ways in which Experiments 1 and
2 may have underestimated the children. First,
although we said that the agent (e.g., Sally) might
want an apple or might want a banana, we failed
to specify that the two options were mutually
exclusive, thus some of the children may have
decided that she liked or disliked both. Second,
because the questions were always asked in a
ﬁxed order—desire ﬁrst and belief second—some
of the children, and especially the youngest ones,
may have had difﬁculty answering the second
question. If so, 4-year-olds’ apparent failure to
infer beliefs may have been due to an overall
degradation in their attention rather than a
speciﬁc difﬁculty with belief questions. In Experi-
ment 3, we address both these concerns by clari-
fying that the options are mutually exclusive and
by always asking the belief question ﬁrst. (We
did this rather than counterbalance order both
because the belief question was of primary inter-
est given that other studies have shown that chil-
dren at this age can infer agents’ desires from
emotional expressions and because the belief
question is presumably harder given children’s
near ceiling performance on the desire question.)
Finally, the previous results enabled us to esti-
mate the effect size, so we ran a power analysis
to ensure that we had sufﬁcient power to detect
above-chance performance (if present). The power
analysis indicated that for a power of 0.80, a
two-tailed alpha less than 0.05, and an effect size
of Cohen’s h = 0.52 (a conservative effect size
calculated based on the replication data in the
valence change conditions), we should test 29
four-year-olds and 29 ﬁve-year-olds. We preregis-
tered this experiment on Open Science Framework
(https://osf.io/nduwg/?view_only=5a9590c9183e4a
01b1a4f3bcb45d6639).
Method
Participants
Fifty-eight children (M = 5.0 years, range: 4.0–
5.9; 50% girls) were recruited from the museum
between March and April 2016. To ensure a bal-
anced distribution across ages, children were
recruited in age bins consisting of 29 four-year-olds
(M = 4.5 years, range: 4.0–4.9; 55% girls) and 29
ﬁve-year-olds (M = 5.5 years, range: 5.0–5.9; 45%
girls).
Materials and Procedure
The materials and procedure for the children
were identical to the initial experiment with two
exceptions. First, when the experimenter introduced
the agent’s possible desires, she speciﬁed that the
two candidate desires were mutually exclusive.
Using the apple–banana story as an example, when
the experimenter placed Picture 2 on the table, she
said,
This is Sally. She either likes apples or she likes
bananas but she doesn’t like both. Today she
wants something to eat. So she might want an
apple, or she might want a banana but we don’t
know which one she wants.
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Second, throughout we asked the belief questions
ﬁrst and the desire questions second.
Coding
Coding was identical to the initial experiment.
Seventy-ﬁve percent of responses were recoded by
an independent coder blind to hypotheses and con-
ditions; there was 99% agreement on children’s
responses. Eight of 464 responses could not be clas-
siﬁed (e.g., “She doesn’t know” and “I don’t
know”); as in previous experiments, these responses
were coded as missing values. Additionally, two
responses were dropped because of sibling interfer-
ence, and two were dropped because of experimen-
tal error.
Results and Discussion
Desires
Although the desire question was asked second
in this experiment, both 4- and 5-year-olds had no
difﬁculty recovering the agents’ desires. There was
a main effect of the valence of the ﬁnal expression,
b = 4.90, SE = 3.59; v2(1, N = 227) = 89.91, p <
.001. The main effect of age was not signiﬁcant,
b = 0.61, SE = 0.45; v2(1, N = 227) = 0.00, p = .947,
and although the interaction between age and the
valence of the ﬁnal expression was signiﬁcant,
b = 1.90, SE = 0.76; v2(1, N = 227) = 6.26, p = .012,
both 5 and 4-year-olds performed near ceiling in
each of the four conditions (5-year-olds—happy–
happy: 27/29, p < .001, 95% CI [0.77, 0.99];
sad–happy: 29/29, p < .001, 95% CI [0.88, 1.00];
sad–sad: 23/28, p < .001, 95% CI [0.63, 0.94];
happy–sad: 24/27, p < .001, 95% CI [0.71, 0.98]; 4-
year-olds—happy–happy: 28/29, p < .001, 95% CI
[0.82, 1.00]; sad–happy: 23/28, p < .001, 95% CI [0.63,
0.94]; sad–sad: 24/29, p < .001, 95% CI [0.64, 0.94];
happy–sad: 23/28, p < .001, 95% CI [0.63, 0.94]).
Beliefs
Overall, we replicated children’s performance.
Speciﬁcally, there was a main effect of age,
b = 0.23, SE = 0.32; v2(1, N = 225) = 14.06,
p < .001, and the presence or absence of a valence
change, b = 5.22, SE = 2.43; v2(1, N = 225) = 21.80,
p < .001, on children’s belief inferences; the interac-
tion was also signiﬁcant, b = 1.34, SE = 0.49; v2(1,
N = 225) = 7.43, p = .006.
Further analyses showed that 5-year-olds’ infer-
ences were affected by the presence or absence of a
valence change, b = 1.90, SE = 0.42; v2(1,
N = 114) = 20.50, p < .001. In the valence change
conditions, they inferred false beliefs (sad–happy:
21/28, p = .013, 95% CI [0.55, 0.89]; happy–sad: 21/
28, p = .013, 95% CI [0.55, 0.89]); in the valence
stable conditions, children inferred true beliefs in
happy–happy condition but not in the sad–sad
condition (happy–happy: 21/29, p = .024, 95% CI
[0.53, 0.87]; sad–sad: 19/29, p = .136, 95% CI [0.46,
0.82]).
The effect of the presence or absence of a valence
change was also signiﬁcant in 4-year-olds, b =
0.86, SE = 0.41; v2(1, N = 111) = 4.39, p = .036,
but it was driven by children’s unpredicted success
in happy–happy condition. In the valence change
conditions, 4-year-olds did not infer false beliefs
(sad–happy: 11/28, p = .345, 95% CI [0.22, 0.59];
happy–sad: 14/28, p = 1.000, 95% CI [0.31, 0.69]); in
the valence stable conditions, they inferred true
beliefs in the happy–happy condition (24/27,
p < .001, 95% CI [0.71, 0.98]) but not in the sad–sad
condition (17/28, p = .345, 95% CI [0.41, 0.79]; see
Figure 2).
In general, the results of Experiment 3 replicate
the previous studies, suggesting that children’s abil-
ity to recover both beliefs and desires from changes
in the valence of agents’ emotional reactions devel-
ops between ages 4 and 5. The success of both 4-
and 5-year-olds at recovering the agent’s beliefs in
the condition when she was happy both in antici-
pating and observing the results was unexpected
and inconsistent with the results of the previous
studies. Note, however, that in this condition chil-
dren could succeed simply by reporting the item
actually observed in the container throughout. It is
interesting that children made this response only in
Experiment 3 and not in the previous studies; how-
ever, 4-year-olds’ failure to recover beliefs in all of
the remaining conditions suggest that their isolated
success in this condition is unlikely to indicate a
genuine ability to recover beliefs from the dynamics
of emotional expressions. Similarly, 5-year-olds’
chance performance in the sad–sad condition sug-
gests that, at best, their ability to recover beliefs
from stable emotional expressions is fragile.
General Discussion
These results suggest that by age 5 children can
use changes in the valence of an agent’s emotional
reaction to recover both her beliefs and desires
in contexts where both are unknown and the
agent’s actions are not differentially informative.
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Four-year-olds used the emotional reactions to
recover the agent’s desires but did not use the
valence change to infer the agent’s beliefs. More-
over, neither age group reliably treated a stable
valence as informative about the agent’s beliefs.
When someone looked happy or sad about both an
expected or observed outcome, adults inferred that
she expected the outcome. By contrast, children
gave inconsistent responses across studies to happy
expressions and consistently chose at chance in
response to sad expressions.
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study looking
at how the dynamics of facial expressions inform
children’s theory of mind. Previous research sug-
gests that children selectively invoke agent’s beliefs
in response to surprised, curious, or frightened
responses to unusual or mysterious events (Rieffe
et al., 2005; Wellman & Banerjee, 1991). Here, how-
ever, and in contrast to studies where the emotional
stakes have been relatively high (at least from a
child’s perspective—lost bunnies, dead turtles,
growling dogs, etc.; Lagattuta et al., 1997; Pons
et al., 2004; Widen & Russell, 2010), 5-year-olds
inferred agents’ beliefs given only happy and sad
expressions and entirely ordinary events (e.g., ﬁnd-
ing fruit in a container). These results suggest that
children treat changes in emotional valence as infor-
mative even when the emotions themselves are of
relatively little import.
In some respects, the current task resembles the
classic unexpected contents task (Hogrefe, Wimmer,
& Perner, 1986; Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987),
in that children have to reassess an initial belief
about the contents of a container based on subse-
quent evidence. However, in the unexpected con-
tents task, the initial belief is explicitly cued by the
container itself (e.g., a “Smarties” container); the
question is whether children continue to access this
belief when it is subsequently proven false. By con-
trast, in the current task, the container provides no
cues to its contents: Children must simultaneously
infer both the content and epistemic status of the
agent’s initial belief. Thus, the current study is not
merely an affective version of an unexpected con-
tents task. Rather, it tests children’s ability to use
emotional expressions to infer the content of mental
states that are otherwise underdetermined by the
agent’s actions and the context.
Like classic false belief tasks, however, this study
arguably makes high demands on information pro-
cessing abilities distinct from theory of mind (see
Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010; Perner & Lang, 1999;
Sodian, 2011; Wellman, 2014 for diverse perspec-
tives and reviews). In light of this, 5-year-olds’
successes in the valence change conditions may be
particularly convincing, and 4-year-olds’ failure less
so. In particular, 4-year-olds were more successful
in recovering the agent’s desires than beliefs. This
might be because children could infer the agent’s
desires in our task by attending only to a single
emotional reaction (the agent’s response to the
observed outcome), whereas inferring beliefs
required children to compare two emotional reac-
tions (the agent’s response to both the anticipated
and observed outcome). Although we cannot rule
out the possibility that the younger children’s fail-
ure may be due to performance deﬁcits, our results
are consistent with a number of studies suggesting
that children represent desires earlier and more
robustly than beliefs (see Wellman & Liu, 2004 for
meta-analysis). One possibility is that the process-
ing demands are bound up with conceptual devel-
opment insofar as the relative subtlety of emotional
cues to beliefs versus desires may contribute to
desires being represented earlier and more robustly
than beliefs.
Additionally, our results are consistent with a
large body of work suggesting that the integration
of emotion understanding and belief–desire psy-
chology undergoes substantial development
between 4 and 6 (e.g., Bradmetz & Schneider, 1999;
De Rosnay et al., 2004; Hadwin & Perner, 1991;
Harris, 2008; Harris et al., 1989; Lagattuta & Well-
man, 2001; Pons et al., 2004; Ruffman & Keenan,
1996; Wellman & Bartsch, 1988; Wellman & Liu,
2004; Widen & Russell, 2008). In particular, a num-
ber of studies suggest that children’s ability to link
mental representations of past events to current
emotions improves over the preschool years. Thus,
for instance, although 4-year-olds understand that
someone’s emotional reaction to an event may
wane over time, not until 6 do children understand
that this depends on whether the person remembers
or forgets the event (Harris et al., 1985). Similarly,
children becoming increasingly able to understand
what kinds of cues about past events might trigger
memories that could affect someone’s emotions in
the present (Lagattuta et al., 1997). In the current
study, children did not have to link a mental repre-
sentation of a past event to a current emotion,
rather they had to use both current and past emo-
tional expressions to infer past mental representa-
tions (the character’s earlier beliefs). However,
improvements in children’s overall ability to repre-
sent the causal relations between mental representa-
tions and emotion over time might contribute to
the developmental change in children’s perfor-
mance between 4 and 6 on this task.
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Given that 5-year-olds recovered the agent’s false
beliefs from the changing valence, why, unlike
adults, did they fail to attribute true beliefs consis-
tently when the agent had the same reaction to
expecting and observing an outcome? Some work
suggests that children’s ability to understand subtle
aspects of emotion (e.g., discrepancies between true
and expressed emotion, or mixed ambivalent emo-
tions) undergoes protracted development (Pons
et al., 2004). A failure to change expressions
between an observed and expected outcome is
prima facie, a very subtle cue to agent’s mental
states: Children’s ability to draw inferences from
such subtle cues might continue to develop through
middle childhood. A related possibility is that the
stable emotional expressions may have been less
salient than the changing ones; thus, children might
have attended less to the emotional reactions over-
all in the same valence conditions. Additionally, we
note that some studies suggest that when children
begin to pass explicit false belief tasks, they overat-
tribute false beliefs when they should not (see
Hedger & Fabricius, 2011 for a review). The current
results might reﬂect an overall increase in children’s
willingness to infer false beliefs rather than true
ones.
A ﬁnal possibility is that 5-year-olds might have
been more likely than adults to allow for the possi-
bility that the agent liked, or disliked, both out-
comes equally (even when, as in Experiment 3, the
experimenter speciﬁed that the preferences were
mutually exclusive). More than adults, children
may have resisted learning the relatively arbitrary
rule that the agent liked only one of the two items
in each category given real-world experience that
children who like (or dislike) fruit, desserts, snacks,
or vegetables tend to apply that preference to the
category as a whole. However, if the agent did like
or dislike both items equally, her emotional
response would be uninformative because it would
be identical whether her expectations were fulﬁlled
or violated. To the degree that children assume the
agent had no preference between outcomes, they
might reasonably treat the agent’s stable valence as
uninformative about her beliefs. In this respect, the
task of jointly inferring an agent’s beliefs and
desires may be more difﬁcult than inferring some-
one’s beliefs when her desires are fully speciﬁed.
Finally, our study assumes that the agent in each
story trusted the bunny’s testimony and thus
formed a belief about what was in the container
and emotionally responded to this belief. This is
consistent with other studies suggesting a strong
default assumption that testimony should be
trusted (e.g., Jaswal, Croft, Setia, & Cole, 2010).
However, across trials, bunnies were unreliable
agents—half the bunnies were correct about the
contents and half were not—and previous research
suggests that 4- and 5-year-olds track the reliability
of informants (see, e.g., Corriveau & Harris, 2009;
Jaswal & Neely, 2006; Koenig, Clement, & Harris,
2004). In this study, children did not have sufﬁcient
information to form reliability judgments given that
the color of the bunny changed on each trial (sug-
gesting that there was a different informant each
time), and no individual agent had prior knowl-
edge about that bunny’s reliability. Nonetheless, we
cannot rule out the possibility that children might
have inferred that the bunny’s testimony led the
actor to represent (and emotionally react to) the
contents the bunny identiﬁed without speciﬁcally
developing an expectation that those contents were
in the container. That is, children might have
inferred that the agent formed a mental representa-
tion consisting of a “thought” about the contents
rather than a “belief” about them and answered the
belief question on this basis. If true, this changes
our account of the results only modestly: Rather
than suggesting that children used the changing
valence between the expected and observed out-
come to infer the agent’s beliefs and desires, it
would suggest that children used the changing
valence between the reported and observed out-
come to infer the agents’ thoughts and desires.
The mental state inferences here were challeng-
ing insofar as the input was impoverished: The
character showed only two expressions and did not
engage in any goal-directed actions. However, the
hypothesis space here was restricted to two alterna-
tives, children had continuous access to the agent’s
emotional reaction to both the expected and actual
outcomes, and the emotional reactions were high-
lighted. In the real world, emotional reactions are
transient and typically go unremarked. Future
research might investigate children’s ability to
recover agent’s beliefs and desires in contexts
where the emotional reactions unfold in time, and
where both the hypotheses and emotional reactions
are more complex than those used here. Future
research might also look at older children to see
when children’s performance converges with
adults’.
The current results, however, suggest that by age
5, children’s intuitive theory of mind begins to sup-
port mental state inferences from others’ emotional
reactions. Extending previous work, children not
only understand that thinking affects feeling (e.g.,
Harris et al., 1985; Lagattuta & Wellman, 2001;
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Lagattuta et al., 1997; Taylor & Harris, 1983), they
can use others’ feelings to infer otherwise unknown
thoughts. When children see someone’s face change
from sadness to happiness, or from happiness to
sadness, they gain insight not only into how the
person feels but also what she wants and believes
about the world.
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